Lessons From Studying the International Economics of Intellectual Property Rights by unknown
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 53 
Issue 6 Issue 6 - Symposium: Taking Stock: The 




Lessons From Studying the International Economics of 
Intellectual Property Rights 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lessons From Studying the International Economics of Intellectual Property Rights, 53 Vanderbilt Law 
Review 2219 (2000) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol53/iss6/36 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more 
information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 




I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................ 2220
II. QUESTIONS ASKED AND PARTIALLY ANSWERED ................ 2221
A. There Are Good Reasons to Study the
International Economics of IPRs .......................... 2221
1. One Size Does Not Fit All .......................... 2221
2. Economies Differ in Important Ways ......... 2223
3. Globalization and Technical Change Lie
at the Root of the Problem ......................... 2224
B. Intellectual Property Rights Are Hard to
M easure ................................................................ 2225
C. Intellectual Property Rights Are Endogenous ........ 2227
D. TRIPS Will Shift Income Among Countries .......... 2228
E. IPRs Stimulate International Economic Activity.. 2230
1. Patents and International Trade ............... 2230
2. Patents and Foreign Direct Investment ..... 2233
3. Patents and Licensing ............................... 2234
F. The Statistical Correlation Between IPRs and
Economic Growth is Positive Under Some
Circum stances ...................................................... 2235
G. Intellectual Property Rights Help Deepen
M arkets ................................................................ 2236
Keith E. Maskus is Professor, Department of Economics, University of Colorado, Boulder,
CO, 80309-0256. He is grateful to the World Bank and to the Institute for International
Economics for supporting some of the research underlying this Article. He thanks Jerome
Reichman, Jayashree Watal, and Carsten Fink for their comments and encouragement.
2219
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
H. Stronger IPRs Need to be Accompanied by
Supportive Policies ............................................... 2238
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS .................................................... 2238
I. INTRODUCTION
When the Uruguay Round negotiations began in 1986, the
subject of intellectual property rights ("IPRs") was completely un-
familiar to international trade economists. Presumably the area
was ignored because global trade policy concerns had not moved
into questions of domestic business regulation. Even today, readers
will search in vain for serious treatments of the trade implications
of exclusive rights to intellectual property ("IP") in international
economics textbooks.
Despite this general inattention, a small but growing litera-
ture has emerged in which trade economists have framed specific
questions and applied theory and statistical analysis to them. This
literature has advanced the understanding of the role of IPRs in the
international economy from the realm of speculation to the bound-
ary of hard analysis based on facts and evidence. It has demon-
strated that it is possible to use data to assess hypotheses about the
economics of global intellectual property protection. Prior to the
construction of the evidence that is the subject of this Article,
strong claims based on largely unexamined assumptions were made
on both sides of the debate. Thus, for example, American trade
authorities could push global negotiations on higher standards of
protection by claiming that they would result in a long-term flow-
ering of innovation and international technology transfer. Oppo-
nents could oppose such standards on the basis of fears that
stronger IPRs would destroy channels of inexpensive access to
technologies, medicines, and information products. Evidence sug-
gests that there is some truth in both claims, but far more exag-
geration.
In this Article, I provide an overview of what international
economists have learned from studying IPRs in the global context.
While progress has been made, many of the results remain subject
to statistical and analytical uncertainty and wide areas of research
remain insufficiently explored. There is much about the functioning
of IPRs that we do not understand very well, particularly in the
context of promoting economic development.
My approach is to list a series of conclusions from the litera-
ture. In each case I note whether the conclusions are robust or re-
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main tentative. The critical feature underlying confidence assess-
ment is whether the hypotheses are supported with systematic
econometric evidence. Inevitably, the inferences drawn reflect
largely my interpretations of this work. Since much of the work re-
viewed is my own, the discussion herein cannot be considered com-
pletely impartial.'
II. QUESTIONS ASKED AND PARTIALLY ANSWERED
Each of the issues covered in this Section could support a se-
ries of extensive articles. My intent here is to distill the main les-
sons and indicate where further research is needed. I state the is-
sues as hypotheses and then provide explanatory discussion.
A. There Are Good Reasons to Study the International Economics of
IPRs
A fundamental question is whether international economists
can add value to the analysis of IPRs. Economic approaches to pat-
ents, copyrights, trademarks, and related devices typically adopt a
closed-economy approach without distinguishing among interests of
different countries. For example, standard patent analysis seeks to
identify optimal patent scope, requiring a complex calculation
among the interests of innovators, consumers, and second comers.
Actual patent regimes may then be assessed relative to optimal
structures, though such comparisons are fraught with conceptual
and practical difficulties.
1. One Size Does Not Fit All
In principle, this approach could be extended to the global
economy with a simple relabeling of interests. Thus, we may iden-
tify four "country types" with divergent interests in global protec-
tion. First, IP exporters are net producers and sellers of intellectual
property, with a consequent interest in strong international rights.
Second, high-income IP importers are net purchasers of intellectual
property but their industries require access to sophisticated tech-
nological inputs and their consumers prefer high-quality, differen-
tiated products. Thus, they generally favor strong protection but
are more amenable to limits on that protection. Third, IP followers
1. The material I review is discussed in far more detail and nuance in my book, KEITH E.
MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2000).
2000] 2221
VANDERBILTLAWREVIEW
are industrializing economies that need access to modern technolo-
gies but prefer that such access be inexpensive and readily diffused
among their industries. Such countries have mixed interests be-
tween protective standards to encourage incoming investment and
technology flows and weak standards to promote imitation and
learning. Finally, low-income IP importers produce little IP domes-
tically and rely on foreign suppliers for new products and technolo-
gies. Their interests lie in having weak IPRs.
Thus, it is possible to envision a global social planner that
would optimally select a set of international IPRs standards that
would achieve balance among these interests, with compensation
paid from countries that gain income to those that lose income.
However, IPRs are the province of national governments, not a
global planner. Accordingly, national policies do not attempt to
maximize global consumer surplus, but rather reflect the predomi-
nance of interests within each country. Thus, for example, it is pos-
sible for stronger patents in industrializing countries to have bene-
ficial long-term effects in terms of enhanced technology transfer
and domestic innovation, but harmful short-term effects in terms of
higher-cost imitation and additional rent transfers to foreign IP
owners. Any country with myopic policymakers would oppose such
protection. This outcome seems likely in that the short-term losers
could be domestic enterprises with strong lobbying power.
Put differently, the existence of different national standards
is a basic reason for studying IPRs as an international economic
issue. Like standard trade barriers, IPRs may be selected to dis-
criminate against foreign interests. Moreover, IPRs may protect the
inefficient rents of favored economic actors.
However, there are three important differences between
trade restrictions and IPRs that diminish the force of this analogy.
First, tariffs and quotas operate as taxes on trade, thereby inter-
fering with economic efficiency and creating wasteful rents. Power-
ful evidence exists that all countries gain from reducing their trade
barriers. In contrast, IPRs are not taxes with clear damage to effi-
ciency. Rather they are business regulations that either support or
hinder the competitive functioning of markets. Therefore, it is im-
possible to establish a uniform standard of optimality that would
apply in each country. Put more starkly, what does "free trade"
mean in the IPRs context? It cannot be based on fully harmonized
standards in all nations. Instead, each country should select stan-
dards that promote efficient growth while minimizing distortionary
influences on the allocation of international trade and investment.
2222 [Vol. 53:6:2219
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This prescription is not easy to translate into practical statements
about global IPRs policy.
A second difference is that while there are strong similarities
among tariffs and quotas in how they affect trade, the term "intel-
lectual property rights" covers an enormous range of policies that
could have quite disparate impacts on economic activity. Patents,
copyrights, trademarks, geographical indications, trade secrets,
protection for chip designs, and plant breeders' rights differ in their
objectives, scope, and operation. It is misleading to claim that any
country has clear interests in strong or weak IPRs, for its interests
likely vary by functional area.
Finally, while trade restrictions may be aimed at overcoming
market failures or achieving particular non-economic goals, they
are inefficient mechanisms for doing so and should be avoided.
Trade barriers fulfill such goals at high cost and, because they are
indirect policies, they may be ineffective or counterproductive. In
contrast, IPRs are more intimately related to issues of social regu-
lation. In the first instance, they are aimed directly at addressing
failures in markets for information and innovation. In so doing,
they could either harm or help prospects for attaining social objec-
tives, such as ensuring reasonable access to information technolo-
gies, medicines, and seed varieties. It is impossible to issue blanket
statements about the inadvisability of employing IPRs for such
purposes.
2. Economies Differ in Important Ways
A second general reason why international economists can
say useful things about IPRs is that closed-economy models need
not pay attention to variations in collateral regulation. For exam-
ple, analyses of American or European Union patent policy cor-
rectly presume that competition law is adequate to prevent inap-
propriate use of market power established in patent grants. How-
ever, competition policies are weak in the vast majority of develop-
ing economies, and simply translating patent models into those
economic contexts is at best misleading. Thus, a licensing practice
that might be a manageable competition problem in the American
market could be a substantial difficulty for authorities in poor
countries.
This observation pertains to a wider class of economic poli-
cies, including restrictions on trade and investment, promotion of
human capital acquisition, development of capital markets, con-
struction of technology infrastructure, and other forms of industrial
20001 2223
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policy. In brief, economies vary widely in their underlying policy
regimes that make IPRs more or less effective. Unfortunately,
analysis of how these factors interact with IPRs at varying levels of
economic development is scarce and discursive rather than system-
atic and empirical.
3. Globalization and Technical Change Lie at the Root of the
Problem
We are in a period of rapidly expanding international economic
activity, particularly regarding implicit or explicit trade in technology
and goods protected by intellectual property rights. Moreover, protection
of intellectual property through patent applications and trademark reg-
istrations is rising rapidly, particularly in major developing economies.2
Thus, the international demand for IPRs is growing dramatically. In
today's global economy, the creation of knowledge and its adaptation to
product designs and production techniques are essential for commercial
success. Firms wish to exploit their technical advantages on an interna-
tional scale and to limit misappropriation from potential rivals. These
tasks are made easier by the adoption of stronger and more uniform
IPRs in different countries.
For their part, governments and enterprises in many industrial-
izing and developing countries increasingly recognize that a closer con-
nection to international sources of technology is important for encour-
aging their own development. Governments agree to strengthen IPRs in
the hope of attracting investment and advanced technologies. Indeed,
domestic firms may lobby for stronger protection in order to facilitate
their linkages with multinational enterprises. Thus, globalization of
technology trade is itself the key factor in explaining systemic change in
intellectual property rights.
Two other factors are critical as well. One is that the costs of
copying and imitating products from important sectors of technology are
falling, making infringement easier and more prevalent. A final strain
on the classical IPRs system is that many of the newer technologies do
not fit comfortably within standard conceptions of industrial property
and artistic property. Computer microcircuits, software programs, bio-
technological inventions, and electronic transmissions all strain the
limits of classical patent or copyright laws. Thus, even within developed
countries the area of intellectual property law remains in considerable
flux.
2. See MASKUS, supra note 1, at 66-73 (providing data on patent applications, trademark
applications, and applications for plant variety registrations in several countries).
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These elements explain the substantial rise in demand on the
part of intellectual property owners for stronger and more harmonized
global standards of protection. In turn, they underlie the massive efforts
mounted by the United States and the European Union to reform the
global IPRs system, culminating in the negotiation of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") in the
World Trade Organization ("TO"). There also has been an accommo-
dating rise in the global supply of IPRs. Whether the increases in de-
mand and supply are in rough balance remains to be seen. However, as I
argue later, many countries are not in a position to enforce tighter stan-
dards. Thus, trade economists could pay attention to mechanisms for
encouraging appropriate compliance with TRIPS and other obligations
in IPRs.
B. Intellectual Property Rights Are Hard to Measure
The most fundamental task supporting empirical analysis is
to measure the strength of IPRs on a consistent international basis.
This is an especially difficult undertaking, and any numerical
measures that claim to capture IPRs accurately are subject to sharp
criticism. IPRs may be compared to underlying characteristics gov-
erning economic structure, such as factor endowments, infrastruc-
ture, and the judicial system. Unlike tariffs, IPRs are not readily
measurable, nor do they have obvious impacts on prices. Compli-
cating the picture is that identical laws may have different effects
in countries that vary in market structures and preferences.
It is impossible to account fully for the magnitude and
strength of IPRs on a comparative basis across countries. Instead,
economists develop qualitative rankings, based on laws, of IPRs as
measures of inputs into economic and social production.
For example, some analysts count the number of World In-
tellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") conventions of which
nations are members as a measure of commitment to minimal
global standards. However, because these conventions cannot be
enforced, membership reflects a "best-efforts" commitment without
much meaning. Thus, economists have found little correlation be-
tween membership and international economic activity.3
Others have attempted to capture the strength of IPRs and
their enforcement more comprehensively through detailed consid-
3. See Michael J. Ferrantino, The Effect of Intellectual Property Rights on International
Trade and Investment, 129 WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV 301, 319-23 (1993).
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eration of each nation's laws.4 The first cross-country index was de-
veloped by Rapp and Rozek ("RR"). 5 They read legal texts regarding
each country's patent laws and assessed their conformity with the
minimum standards proposed by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 6
Their approach considered only the existence of features of patent
law, such as working requirements and product patents for phar-
maceuticals, and did not consider enforcement. Their scale ranged
from zero, signifying the absence of a patent law, to five, indicating
full conformity with the minimum standards. Thus, the index was
subjective and attempted to capture differences in many complex
legal issues.
This approach was extended significantly by Ginarte and
Park ("GP"). 7 They rated the patent laws of most countries every
five years from 1960 to 1990, based on five components: duration of
protection, extent of coverage, membership in international patent
agreements, provisions for loss of protection, and enforcement
measures.8 Each component was further broken down into charac-
teristics determining its effective strength. 9 These sub-components
were aggregated into national scores, with a minimum possible
score of 0.0 and a maximum of 5.0.10 The GP index is a more com-
prehensive reflection of variations in patent laws than is RR. One
interesting feature of the former is that it showed little change in
legislated patents in the 1980s but significant and widespread
strengthening between 1990 and 1995.
The GP and RR indexes offer useful information about legal
commitments to protecting patents over a broad set of nations.
However, the difficulties of capturing the effective strength of a
complex range of policies in a single index must be kept in mind.
Further, no studies have assessed the international strength of
copyrights, trademarks, or plant breeders' rights.
4. For early attempts, see the papers collected in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:
GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? (Michael R. Gadbaw & Timothy J. Richards eds., 1988).
. 5. See Richard T. Rapp & Richard P. Rozek, Benefits and Costs of Intellectual Property Pro-
tection in Developing Countries, J. WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1990, at 75, 78-81.
6. See id. (citing UNITED STATES CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, GUIDELINES FOR STANDARDS
FOR THE PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF PATENTS (1987)).
7. See generally Juan Carlos Ginarte & Walter G. Park, Determinants of Patent Rights: A
Cross-National Study, 26 RES. POLY 283 (1997).
8. See id. at 284. These data have now been updated to 1995 and were provided to the





C. Intellectual Property Rights Are Endogenous
Unsurprisingly, there is a positive correlation between pat-
ent rights and real GNP per capita. This claim was first analyzed
by Maskus and Penubarti using a version of the RR index.11 In fact,
it seems that patent rights become weaker as incomes rise from low
levels, strengthen at middle-income levels, and accelerate at high-
est income levels. Thus, there is a quadratic relationship between
IPRs and GNP per capita. I have updated this analysis using the
GP index for 1990 and a sample of 72 countries.'2 To the basic
specification I added the number of the scientists and engineers
employed as a percentage of the labor force, measures of aggregate
market size, openness to trade and investment, and the secondary
school enrollment ratio as determinants of patent rights. Controls
were added for whether countries were former British or French
colonies, which has a material effect on their patent laws. Inde-
pendent variables were lagged five years. This specification re-
sulted in the following equation:
PATENT = 10.8 - 2.58log(INCOME) + 0.17[log(INCOME)] 2 -
0.01SCHOOL + 0.06OPEN - 0.01log(GDP) + 0.08S&E
+ 0.23UKCOL + 0.33FCOL;
R 2 = 0.37.
Significant coefficients are in boldface. Note that, controlling
for other influences, the inverted-U relationship between patent
strength and real per-capita income remains intact. Using these
results, the income at which expected patent protection becomes
weakest is approximately $2,000 per capita in 1985 international
dollars. Moreover, the expected patent index is the same for econo-
mies with per-capita GNP of $500 and $7750, indicating that there
is a large range of income variation before protection becomes
stronger than at its low-income levels.
The variable measuring trade openness had a significant im-
pact on the patent index. 13 The school enrollment ratio was insig-
nificant, perhaps because secondary enrollment figures mask sub-
stantial differences in human capital formation. The intensity of
scientists and engineers in the labor force had a strongly positive
11. See Keith E. Maskus & Mohan Penubarti, How Trade Related Are Intellectual Property
Rights?, 39 J. INT'L ECON. 227, 235-37, 240 (1995).
12. See MASKUS, supra note 1, at 102-09.




impact on patent strength. Thus, as economies engage in more in-
ventive activity the demand for intellectual property protection
grows.
The finding that patent protection falls as incomes rise to
moderate levels before rising again suggests that economies in the
early stages of industrialization have the strongest interests in
weak IPRs. As their manufacturing sectors deepen they find
stronger patents helpful in ensuring orderly technology transfer
and protecting their own innovation. For example, for many middle-
income economies, including Brazil and Mexico, actual protection
lagged behind that predicted by the regression equation. In this re-
gard, the significant upgrading of IPRs observed in the 1990s in
Brazil and Mexico likely resulted in part from stronger domestic
interests in tighter protection.
D. TRIPS Will Shift Income Among Countries
An interesting question is whether TRIPS will have an im-
portant short-run impact on the international distribution of patent
rents. A recent attempt at studying this question was made by
McCalman. 14 He looked at bilateral patent statistics across 29 coun-
tries in 1988 and analyzed the implicit values of those patent
rights. It is possible to infer the value of patent rights in each coun-
try by relating the decision to patent to local conditions. The GP
index is useful for such analysis for it decomposes patent laws into
components reflecting their specific characteristics. This permitted
a close attempt at capturing the patent changes required by TRIPS
in each country. For example, Canada has strengthened its en-
forcement mechanisms and has raised the private value of patents
by removing working requirements. Similarly, many developing
countries must upgrade enforcement, remove working require-
ments, provide for reversal of burden of proof, and lengthen patent
duration. Because such components may be identified in the GP
index, their impact on patent value could be estimated econometri-
cally.
McCalman applied these estimates to bilateral patent data
to compute the anticipated rise in patent value. By making imita-
tion more costly, stronger patents would permit higher license fees
for inventors, generating higher net rent transfers abroad to the
14. See generally Phillip McCalman, Reaping What You Sow: An Empirical Analysis of In-




extent that licensors are foreign. In turn, the higher license fees on
existing patents would cut the willingness of local firms to license,
generating additional losses. It is important to understand the na-
ture of this exercise, which was to ask what the additional net pres-
ent value of patents would have been in 1988, had each country in
the data sample provided patent rights in compliance with TRIPS.
Because innovation and patenting rates were held constant, it was
inherently a static exercise in shifting rents. I have updated
McCalman's figures to millions of 1995 dollars through the use of
national GDP deflators and exchange rates.
The computations demonstrate that the overwhelming share
of rents transferred by stronger global patent rights would accrue
to the United States. TRIPS required the United States to
strengthen its patent regime only marginally, implying a small
outward rent transfer on existing patents. However, American
firms owned huge portfolios of patents abroad. The additional
strength of patent laws in host countries would have transferred an
additional $5.85 billion in rents, for a net gain to the United States
of $5.76 billion. Other developed countries that would receive net
inward transfers include Germany ($1.23 billion) France ($831 mil-
lion), Italy ($277 million), Sweden ($217 million), and Switzerland
($36 million). The United Kingdom would experience a sizeable
gross inward rent flow of around $588 million, but a larger outflow
of $1.22 billion. The United Kingdom was required by TRIPS to
provide for preliminary injunctions, establish reversal of burden of
proof in certain process patent cases, and make willful patent in-
fringement subject to criminal action.' 5 The Japanese case was
similar, with a net rent loss of $589 million. Among developed
economies, Canada would realize the largest net loss from net
changes in patent values, at $1.04 billion. Canadian patent changes
would increase sharply the value of patents held there. However,
foreign patents held by Canadian firms are overwhelmingly located
in the United States and their value would not increase by much.
Among developing countries, the gross outward transfer
would rise with the size of economies and the extent of patent re-
form. Because its citizens own so few patents, India would receive
negligibly higher inward transfers, but the value of foreign-owned
patents would rise by $430 million. The result for Korea was simi-
lar, with a net outward transfer of $454 million. However, this re-
15. These calculations reflect McCalman's interpretation of how well the GP index captured




sult is outdated because Korean firms have been granted far more
patents abroad since 1988. Thus, applied to 2000 patent portfolios
the gross inward transfer would be much larger. Brazil would expe-
rience the largest net outward transfer among all countries in the
sample, at $1.7 billion. 16
These rent transfers are economically significant. Thus, for
example, the rent-transfer gain on patents of $5.9 billion would
complement U.S. short-run gains from standard trade liberalization
in the Uruguay Round by 42%.17 Canada's short-run gains would be
cut by 94 percent, from $1.106 billion to $66 million, and Brazil's by
76 percent, from $2.239 billion to $532 million. Accounting for the
patent-valuation aspect of TRIPS, Mexico would actually experience
a net welfare loss in the short run. McCalman went on to compute
the deadweight losses in each country from forcing technology pur-
chasers to pay higher prices. Net static welfare impacts would be
the sum of the rent transfers and deadweight patent losses. Only
the United States accrued large welfare gains, though France,
Germany, and Italy registered small net benefits. Across all coun-
tries, the welfare losses induced by stronger patents amounted to as
much as 20% of the global efficiency gains from trade liberalization.
E. IPRs Stimulate International Economic Activity
The preceding discussion suggests that for technology im-
porting nations to benefit from stronger IPRs there must be dy-
namic gains that could emerge over time. Such gains could come
from enhanced flows of international trade, investment, and tech-
nology transfer, which would augment growth prospects. The em-
pirical literature is reasonably optimistic on this score.
1. Patents and International Trade
Intellectual property rights were taken up in the Uruguay
Round on the grounds that weak and variable standards distort in-
ternational trade. In theory, limited protection could raise or reduce
trade, depending on demand characteristics, market structure, the
ability of countries to prevent infringement, and other factors. It is
also possible that highly protective IPRs could deter legitimate
trade or facilitate collusive behavior that would limit competition
16. For further calculations, see MASKUS, supra note 1, at 184.
17. These trade-liberalization gains were taken from Glenn A. Harrison et al., Quantifying
the Uruguay Round, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 217 (Will Martin
& L. Alan Winters eds., 1996).
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through trade.'8 The basic tradeoff when countries adopt stronger
patents is between greater market power for rights-owning firms,
permitting higher profits on lower trade volumes, and greater mar-
ket demand for those firms as local imitators are made less com-
petitive, inducing higher trade flows. Thus, no certain prediction
may be made about the impacts of variable patent rights on trade
volumes. A clear picture can emerge only from empirical analysis.
In a pair of studies, Maskus and Penubarti estimated the
impact of patent rights on 1984 bilateral trade in manufacturing
sectors.19 The data set incorporated 22 exporting countries and 71
importing nations covering all levels of economic development. Ex-
planatory variables included importer per-capita GNP, tariffs in the
importer, and a version of the RR index. The patent index was in-
teracted with dummy variables for small and large developing
countries in order to capture the effects of market size and techno-
logical capacity.
The authors found that within the group of large developing
economies the strength of national patent laws exerted a statisti-
cally significant and positive effect on bilateral imports in many
product categories. Thus, in these countries the market-expansion
effect dominated. Put differently, weak patents in large developing
economies are barriers to manufacturing exports from the OECD
countries. The impacts were positive but weaker in the group of
small developing countries, suggesting that net market-expansion
effects largely operated in these nations as well. Interestingly, the
pharmaceuticals sector registered positive impacts of patents on
import volumes.
To assess the economic significance of these results, I com-
puted the increases in international trade flows that the model
would predict from changes in national patent rights.20 The coeffi-
cients were applied to crude estimates of the rise in patent indexes
implied by implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. The scenarios
entailed marked increases in the indexes of developing countries
but did not impose full harmonization with laws in developed coun-
tries. The implied trade effects were long run in nature and would
emerge only after TRIPS standards are phased in and markets ad-
just to the new policy regimes. Taking all manufacturing goods to-
18. See Keith E. Maskus & Mohan Penubarti, Patents and International Trade: An Empiri-
cal Study, in QUIET PIONEERING: ROBERT M. STERN AND His INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LEGACY
95, 95-97 (Keith E. Maskus et al. eds., 1997).
19. See id.; Maskus & Penubarti, supra note 11, at 233-37, 244.
20. See MASKUS, supra note 1, at 115.
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gether, in the small developing economies as a group perhaps $2.7
billion in additional annual imports would be created. This came to
6.2% of total merchandise imports of this group in 1984. Manufac-
turing imports by the large developing countries would expand by
between $14.7 billion and $24.2 billion per year. These sums range
from 5.4% to 8.9% of 1984 merchandise imports of these nations,
suggesting that stronger patent rights would cause marked in-
creases in import demand. Finally, the small policy changes envi-
sioned in the developed economies would induce an additional $7.9
billion in imports, or perhaps 0.6% of merchandise imports.
Smith recently updated these studies by analyzing manufac-
turing exports of U.S. states to 96 countries in 1992.21 Smith at-
tempted to identify market-power and market-expansion effects in
countries distinguished by their abilities to imitate products. Her
econometric results found that market-expansion effect dominated
among the industrial countries, attesting to the effectiveness of
their IPRs in deterring imitation. This was especially the case in
patent-sensitive industries, such as chemicals and instruments.
The market-expansion impact was pronounced in U.S. trade with
middle-income economies displaying weak patent rights and strong
imitation threats. Thus, countries such as Brazil and Malaysia
should observe rising trade volumes as protection increases. Fi-
nally, the market-power effect dominated among the group of na-
tions, primarily the least developed countries, with weak imitation
and strong patent regimes.
These studies support two important conclusions. First,
weak patent rights are significant barriers to manufacturing trade,
particularly in IPRs-sensitive goods. However, this situation holds
primarily within the group of industrializing economies that pose
credible imitation threats. It is no surprise that these countries
have been the main focus of complaints about weak intellectual
property rights. As these countries strengthen their regimes, they
should attract rising import volumes of high-technology goods,
which may have a beneficial growth impact. Second, poor countries
without much ability to imitate products are not a competitive
threat. Thus, their weak patent regimes do not concern technology
developers. As they adopt stronger patents their economies could be
exposed to monopoly impacts with negative effects on their terms of
trade.
21. See Pamela J. Smith, Are Weak Patent Rights a Barrier to U.S. Exports?, 48 J. INV'L
ECON. 151, 158-59 (1999).
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2. Patents and Foreign Direct Investment
Economic theory suggests that the relationships between
IPRs and Foreign Direct Investment ("FDI") are subtle and com-
plex. 22 Identifying these relationships requires empirical analysis.
Despite their potential significance, few studies have included IPRs
as a potential determinant of FDI. Two early studies could not find
any relationship between simple measures of IP protection and the
international distribution of FDI by U.S. multinational enter-
prises. 23 Nor could a more recent paper find significant effects of
patent rights on FDI in a gravity framework. 24 Thus, there are
doubts about the ability of econometric studies to find such impacts.
Two recent studies find positive evidence, however. In the
first, survey results were used to develop an index of perceived
weakness of IPRs in destination countries on the part of U.S.
firms.25 In the econometric model, the authors found that weak pat-
ents had a significantly negative impact on the location of American
FDI.26 In the second, I argued that estimation should account for
the joint decisions made by MNEs. 27 In particular, multinational
firms may choose to export, increase investment, or transfer tech-
nology directly in response to stronger patent rights.28 I estimated a
simultaneous set of equations to capture these joint impacts, con-
trolling for other relevant influences, for a set of 46 destination
countries, using annual data from 1989-1992.29
To summarize results, the level of patent strength in devel-
oping countries was positively associated with both exports to af-
22. See Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign
Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 109, 128 (1998).
23. See Edwin Mansfield, Unauthorized Use of Intellectual Property: Effects on Investment,
Technology Transfer, and Innovation, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 107, 112-14 (Mitchell B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993);
Keith E. Maskus & Denise Eby Konan, Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights: Issues and
Exploratory Results, in ANALYTICAL AND NEGOTIATING ISSUES IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM
401, 406 (Alan V. Deardorff& Robert M. Stern eds., 1994)
24. See Carlos A. Primo Braga & Carsten Fink, International Transactions in Intellectual
Property and Developing Countries, 19 INT'L J. TECH. MGMT. 35, 38-42 (2000).
25. See Jeong-Yeon Lee & Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection and U.S. For-
eign Direct Investment, 78 REv. ECON. & STAT. 181, 181-83 & tbls.1-3 (1996).
26. See id. at 185-86 & tbL4; see also Braga & Fink, supra note 24, at 46 (discussing short-
comings of the Lee and Mansfield approach including a biased selection of countries and an in-
ability to control for other influences on investor perceptions).
27. See generally Keith E. Maskus, The International Regulation of Intellectual Property,
134 WELWIRTSCHAFrLICHES ARCHIV 186 (1998).
28. See id. at 196-202.
29. See id. at 198-99.
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filiates and affiliate sales.30 The coefficient on the patent index was
negative and significant in the assets equation for developed
economies, but the impact in developing countries was significantly
positive.31 Thus, a one-unit increase in the patent index of the aver-
age developing economy would raise the asset stock of U.S. multi-
national affiliates by about 16%, or $1.9 billion.32 The evidence
therefore suggests that U.S.-headquartered MNEs are sensitive to
improvements in IPRs in developing countries in making foreign
location decisions. 33 However, these investments may come at the
expense of reduced presence in developed economies, where a sub-
stitution effect between FDI and licensing becomes dominant once
patent protection exceeds a particular level.3 4
3. Patents and Licensing
Economic theory suggests that technology and product li-
censing also would be influenced ambiguously by stronger patent
laws. Stronger IPRs would reduce the risk of local imitation,
thereby raising rents to foreign licensors and causing licensing vol-
umes to fall. However, tighter protection would lower the costs of
achieving licensing contracts, raising incentives to license.35 Again,
the issue is empirical.
One recent study considered the real volumes of license fees
for industrial processes, paid by unaffiliated foreign firms to U.S.
firms, in 26 countries for the years 1985, 1990, and 1995.36 These
volumes were regressed on the GP patent index in addition to sev-
eral control variables. The authors found that unaffiliated royalties
and license fees were positively and significantly affected by patent
rights, but only once the patent index exceeded a critical value of
2.07 on a five-point scale. To the extent that license fees reflect the
value of underlying technology, this finding supports the notion






35. For discussion and details, see Guifang Yang & Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property
Rights, Licensing, and Innovation in an Endogenous Product-Cycle Model, J. INIL ECON. (forth-
coming 2000).
36. See Guifang Yang & Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing: An
Econometric Investigation, 136 WELTWIRTSCHAFLICHES ARCHIV (forthcoming 2000).
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those countries that have enacted at least modest technology pro-
tection.
F. The Statistical Correlation Between IPRs and Economic Growth
is Positive Under Some Circumstances
One may question claims that the strength of intellectual
protection is positively correlated with economic growth. After all,
many countries have developed economically in the presence of
weak IPRs, including Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and, arguably, the
United States. Other countries have suffered stagnation in the
presence of weak IPRs, including Brazil, Argentina, and India.
Clearly there are many factors involved.
However, the economic evidence reviewed above provides
scope for IP protection to enhance growth indirectly by promoting
trade, FDI, and licensing. Each of these flows is a source of technol-
ogy transfer. Imports of capital goods from technologically advanced
nations have been shown to raise productivity in developing coun-
tries.37 Foreign direct investment has a similar impact, although
the effect strengthens as countries expand their levels of education
above some threshold level.38 Licensing directly transfers technol-
ogy and know-how. Finally, patent applications may be read in or-
der to develop competing products. Evidence exists that patenting
activity among developed countries is strongly correlated with
knowledge spillovers across borders.3 9
While these processes are complex, two conclusions are sup-
ported by evidence. First, IPRs encourage growth more readily in
economies that are open to international trade and investment. In
addition to the direct positive impacts, competition from abroad en-
courages domestic firms to invest in technology and product quality.
Moreover, firms in open economies are more likely to undertake the
costs of technology transfer and adaptation when those investments
are supported by IPRs. A recent study discovered that the impact of
stronger patents in open economies was to raise growth rates by
0.66% on average in comparison with closed economies. 40 Thus,
37. See David T. Coe et al., North-South R&D Spillovers, 45 ECON. J. 134, 136, 147 (1997).
38. See E. Borensztein et al, How Does Foreign Direct Investment Affect Economic Growth?,
45 J. INT'L ECON. 115, 134 (1998).
39. See generally Jonathon Eaton & Samuel J. Kortum, Trade in Ideas: Patenting and Pro-
ductivity in the OECD, 40 J. INTrL ECON. 251 (1996).
40. See David NE Gould & William C. Gruben, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in
Economic Growth, 48 J. DEv. ECON. 323, 341 (1996).
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market liberalization combined with stronger IPRs tends to in-
crease growth. 4
1
Second, other relevant economic characteristics influence the
effectiveness of IPRs. One study found no direct correlation between
patent strength and growth, but there was a strong and positive
impact of patents on physical investment and on R&D spending,
which in turn raised growth performance.42 Another paper demon-
strated that FDI raises growth performance in economies with suf-
ficient stocks of human capital and skilled labor.43 These features
are important for promoting local adaptation and learning new
technologies.
Thus, IPRs, openness, investment, and human capital accu-
mulation seem to work jointly in raising productivity and economic
growth. Unfortunately, these impacts have taken little root in the
least developed countries. They appear to become more complex and
cumulative as countries grow richer. Thus, the role of IPRs in
growth is intertwined with the details of complicated development
processes.
G. Intellectual Property Rights Help Deepen Markets
One core reason for a sustained lack of economic develop-
ment in poor countries is that institutions fail to support the devel-
opment of extended markets.4 Weak IPRs may play a central role
in this failure. Inadequate IPRs can stifle technical change even at
low levels of economic development. Most innovation in developing
countries involves small adaptations of existing technologies. These
investments benefit from local patent or utility model protection.
For example, utility models have been shown to improve productiv-
ity in farm-implement markets in Brazil and the Philippines.
45
A recent study analyzed how the Japanese patent system af-
fected Japanese technical progress since the second world war.
46
The system was designed to encourage incremental innovation and
41. See id. at 345-46.
42. See Walter G. Park & Carlos Ginarte, Intellectual Property Rights & Economic Growth,
15 CONTEMP. ECON. POLY, July 1997, at 51, 60.
43. See Borensztein et al., supra note 38, at 123-25.
44. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Markets, Market Failures, and Development, 79 AM. ECON. REV.
197, 201-02 (1989).
45. See Robert E. Evenson & Larry E. Westphal, Technological Change and Technology
Strategy, in 3A HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 2209, 2257, 2261, 2271, 2278 (Jere
Behrman & T.N. Srinivasan eds., 1995).
46. See Keith E. Maskus & Christine McDaniel, Impacts of Japanese Patent System on Pro-
ductivity and Growth, 11 JAPAN & WORLD ECON. 557, 568-72 (1999).
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diffusion of knowledge into the economy through early disclosure of
patent applications, utility models, and narrow claim requirements.
The authors found that this system promoted large numbers of
utility model applications for incremental inventions, which were
based in part on laid-open prior applications for invention patents.
In turn, utility models had a strongly positive impact on real pro-
ductivity growth over the period. They concluded that utility models
and patent applications were an important source of technical
change and information diffusion in Japan.
Innovation through new product development and estab-
lishment of new firms may be discouraged by weak trademark pro-
tection in developing nations. A recent survey of trademark use in
Lebanon provided evidence on this point.47 Firms in the apparel and
food products industries wished to design clothing aimed at Middle
Eastern markets. Attempts to do so were frustrated by trademark
infringement by other firms in Lebanon and neighboring countries.
Similar problems exist in China and retard the interprovincial
marketing of products, as evidenced in another case study.48 Thus,
new business activity may be restrained by trademark infringement
targeted at domestic enterprises.
Entertainment and publishing firms in many developing
countries tend to be small and often incapable of expanding their
operations beyond minimal levels. In part, this problem is caused
by extensive local piracy in the face of weakly enforced copyrights.
However, a further structural difficulty is that inadequate copy-
rights cannot support the complex contracts that allocate rights in
modern creative industries. For example, in China, the software
industry has grown in the area of business applications, but has
faced obstacles in developing fundamental program platforms.
Thus, domestic commercial interests in stronger copyrights have
emerged and are promoting enforcement. In contrast, India has
long had a system of effective copyright protection, which is thought
by many observers to have been important in developing and pro-
tecting its successful film and software industries.
47. See Keith E. Maskus, Strengthening Intellectual Property Rights in Lebanon, in
CATCHING UP WITH THE COMPETITION: TRADE OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR ARAB
COUNTRIES 251, 253-54 (Bernard Hoekman & Jamel E. Zarrouk eds., 2000).
48. See Keith E. Maskus et al., Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development in
China (September 16, 1998) (paper presented at the Southwest China Regional Conference on
Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development, on file with author).
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H. Stronger IPRs Need to be Accompanied by Supportive Policies
Tighter IPRs by themselves cannot improve development
prospects without appropriate collateral institutions. Intellectual
property protection generates market power that could have delete-
rious short-term impacts on information users, even as it promises
long-term benefits through innovation and technology acquisition.
However, countries should complement their new regimes with
policies that raise the likelihood of achieving long-term gains. 49
While the range of such policies is broad, four categories are par-
ticularly important.
First, as discussed earlier, IPRs enhance growth more read-
ily in open economies. Thus, market liberalization and the removal
of distribution monopolies should encourage dynamic gains from
IPRs. Second, because adequate supplies of human capital promote
innovation and technology adoption, it is important to invest in
education. Third, IPRs are economically useful only where innova-
tions may be brought freely to the marketplace. Thus, countries
should reduce impediments to the commercialization of new knowl-
edge within their national innovation systems.
Finally, it is conceivable that countries could be harmed by
anticompetitive abuse of IPRs, requiring them to be vigilant in the
application of appropriate competition policies. Competition regula-
tion is a new and difficult issue for most developing countries.
Thus, as IPRs systems are strengthened they should be accompa-
nied by the development of modern competition-maintenance re-
gimes aimed at curbing abusive licensing practices, monopoly pric-
ing, and unwarranted market segmentation. This complex area re-
quires considerable thought in its implementation.
50
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The claim in this Article is that economists have made sub-
stantial progress in understanding the complex tradeoffs that exist
in the interplay between intellectual property rights and interna-
tional economics. Adding an international dimension to the study of
IPRs makes the analysis more complex because of the great diver-
49. See MASKUS, supra note 1, at 200-16.
50. See generally id.; Nancy T. Gallini & Michael J. Trebilcock, Intellectual Property Rights
and Competition Policy, in COMPETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 17, 18-27 (Robert Anderson & Nancy T. Gallini eds., 1998); Keith
E. Maskus & Mohamed Lahouel, Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights in Develop-
ing Countries: Interests in Unilateral Initiatives and a WTO Agreement, 23 WORLD ECON. 595,
601-07 (2000).
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sity of interests in protection among nations. However, it also opens
up new avenues for investigating the economic implications of
stronger global IPRs established by TRIPS.
The complexity of intellectual property protection supports
both optimistic and pessimistic claims about how countries will be
affected. None of these claims may be decisively rejected by theo-
retical or empirical analysis. However, the work reviewed here has,
to an important degree, pushed back the veil of ignorance. In brief,
it suggests that the short-run impacts of TRIPS will be essentially
redistributive between countries, with the bulk of gains accruing to
the United States and other technology developers. Over the longer
term, however, there are mechanisms that could enhance technical
change and growth in the technology importing countries. To
achieve those gains, developing nations should complement their
stronger regimes with appropriate collateral policy reforms. While
these conclusions seem warranted by the evidence marshaled to
date, it is evident that much work remains to be done.

